Rose had his local attorney, James Burdick , and his California counsel, Keith Davidson, submit a lengthy brief in an attempt to avoid jail.  As if I were Nostradamus, Judge Small held that ”there are issues of punishment and deterrence. The one thing that people never want — that they will hire expensive lawyers to avoid — is jail time. That’s why I believe it is the right punishment.”

Rose, who adamantly proclaimed his innocence initially saying he was not drunk, is probably feeling embarrassed, humiliated and anxious with his jail sentence looming.  Davidson, however, railed against the judge, claiming that Judge Small was “legislating from the bench.”

Judge Small would have offered a fair trial in this case.  Rose opted to plead guilty, spending his money trying to change the judge’s philosophy.  For whatever my opinion is worth, Rose should have exercised his right to a jury trial in this case.  He’d be feeling a lot better today with headlines declaring that a jury had found him not guilty.

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution contained in article VI, paragraph 2, establishes that the U.S. Constitution, Federal Statutes, and U.S. treaties are “the supreme law of the land.” It states that:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.

This “assures that the Constitution and federal laws and treaties take precedence over state law and binds all judges to adhere to that principle in their courts.”

Marijuana is illegal under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). However, 15 states currently have legalized some form of medical marijuana: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington and the District of Columbia.

Jumping into the preemption doctrine is an unwise and potentially treacherous journey down the rabbit hole. Professor Richard Epstein, one of the most influential legal thinkers of modern times, has referred to the preemption doctrine as an “arcane topic” that has recently “generated much public debate.” The “[o]nce-esoteric questions over the federal preemption of state law are now the subject of a prominent, politically charged debate.” These debates cover the historic police powers traditionally exercised by state governments to advanced regulatory schemes that include environmental protection, where “billions of dollars hang on regulatory nuances and complex points of law.” As Epstein explains, “preemption law often tests the patience of even the wonkiest lawyer.”

The Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 USC § 801 et seq.,  sets forth a detailed schedule of various drugs and regulates these substances, enacting criminal provisions and penalties not unlike Michigan’s Public Health Code, particularly MCL § 333.7101 et seq. If these two laws disagree, does the Supremacy Clause overrule Michigan’s law?  And if it does, how far does preemption reach into striking Michigan’s laws?

In a case heavily relied upon by the Dearborn judge, a divided US Supreme Court addressed California’s medical marijuana laws. In Gonzales v Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (U.S. 2005), the majority exercised judicial restraint, holding that the CSA was a valid exercise of Congressional power. The Court held:

The case is made difficult by respondents’ strong arguments that they will suffer irreparable harm because, despite a congressional finding to the contrary, marijuana does have valid therapeutic purposes. The question before us, however, is not whether it is wise to enforce the statute in these circumstances; rather, it is whether Congress’ power to regulate interstate markets for medicinal substances encompasses the portions of those markets that are supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally. Well-settled law controls our answer. The CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as applied to the troubling facts of this case. Under the Raich decision, there is little doubt that Congress could explicitly preempt state laws that permit the use and cultivation of medical marijuana. Importantly, however, the Court restricted its holding, ruling that the federal authorities could enforce federal laws if they chose to exercise those powers. As a result, California’s medical marijuana law was left largely untouched, but federal authorities were allowed to enforce federal prohibitions.

In an employment law case, a private employer took adverse action against an employee for off-work medical marijuana use. The employee brought suit, and the Supreme Court of Oregon held that the CSA preempted the state law. In accord with the doctrine of judicial restraint, the Court limited its ruling, holding that:

The only issue that employer’s preemption argument raises is whether federal law preempts [Oregon’s medical marijuana law] to the extent that it authorizes the use of medical marijuana. In holding that federal law does preempt that subsection, we do not hold that federal law preempts the other sections of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act that exempt medical marijuana use from criminal liability. [Emphasis added.]

Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 348 Ore. 159, 172 n 12 (Or. 2010).

In yet another recent employment law case, a Michigan federal district court refused to rule whether Michigan’s medical marijuana law violated the preemption doctrine, holding instead that the MMMA did not create a private cause of action against an employer. As the Court held, “the Court does not reach the issue of the MMMA’s preemption by federal statutes. See Qwest Corp. v City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1267 n. 7 (10th Cir. 2004) (‘Because federal preemption of a state or local law is premised on the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and because of the longstanding principle that federal courts should avoid reaching constitutional questions if there are other grounds upon which a case can be decided,’ the Court must determine whether the matter can be decided without turning to federal preemption.)” Casias v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15244, 16-17 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2011)

Several California cases have dealt with the preemption issue before the 19th District Court in Dearborn decided Brandon. These opinions go completely unaddressed by the Brandon Court, even though these decision provide persuasive guidance on the issue.

First, in City of Garden Grove v Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 4th 355, 383 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2007), the Court addressed whether a municipal government must return marijuana to a patient after it was seized in contradiction of the state medical marijuana law. The city argued that the marijuana should not be returned because it constituted contraband under federal laws, and the CSA preempted the state law. The Court rejected the preemption argument, holding:

[The] assumption against preemption has particular force in this case. Preemption, it must be remembered, is fundamentally a question of congressional intent. And we are adjured to presume against preemption unless we find it to be the “ ‘ “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” ’ ” But in enacting the CSA, Congress made it clear it did not intend to preempt the states on the issue of drug regulation. Indeed, “[t]he CSA explicitly contemplates a role for the States in regulating controlled substances … .” It provides:“No provision of [the CSA] shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that provision … and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.” (21 U.S.C. § 903.) “This express statement by Congress that the federal drug law does not generally preempt state law gives the usual assumption against preemption additional force.” [Internal citations omitted.]

Garden Grove was appealed to the US Supreme Court, which declined to review the issue on December 1, 2008. This establishes tacit approval short of an endorsement by the high court.

In County of San Diego v San Diego NORML, 165 Cal. App. 4th 798 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2008), the California courts addressed whether “conflict preemption” or, alternatively, “obstacle preemption” barred state medical marijuana laws. Finding no positive conflict between the medical marijuana law and federal laws consistent with the CSA, the court rejected conflicted preemption. Furthermore, the court held that obstacle preemption was inapplicable because “not every state law posing some de minimus impediment will be preempted. To the contrary, ‘[d]isplacement will occur only where, as we have variously described, a ‘significant conflict’ exists between an identifiable ‘federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law.’”

The United State Supreme Court refused to review San Diego on May 18, 2009. Thus, the California medical marijuana survived a second attack on preemption grounds before the high court.

Finally, in Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of Anaheim, 187 Cal. App. 4th 734, 758 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2010), a California court addressed the preemption doctrine once again. As the California court described:

[The California] Supreme Court has identified “four species of federal preemption: express, conflict, obstacle, and field. First, express preemption arises when Congress ‘define[s] explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law. Pre-emption fundamentally is a question of congressional intent . . . and when Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts’ task is an easy one.’ Second, conflict preemption will be found when simultaneous compliance with both state and federal directives is impossible. Third, obstacle preemption arises when ‘ “under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” ’ Finally, field preemption, i.e., ‘Congress’ intent to pre-empt all state law in a particular area,’ applies ‘where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress “left no room” for supplementary state regulation.’”

The first and the last of the foregoing categories do not apply here, given language in the CSA “demonstrat[ing] Congress intended to reject express and field preemption of state laws concerning controlled substances.”

[Internal citations omitted; emphasis added.]

In the Brandon decision, Judge Somers held, in cursory fashion, that the MMMA is preempted under all four doctrines, without further analysis. In less than 3 pages, the Dearborn decision presumes to render the MMMA unconstitutional without addressing the nuances presented by the California cases that have been repeatedly survived appeals to the US Supreme Court. In fact, the Dearborn decision nearly abandons any analysis of the CSA, while making sweeping declarations striking Michigan’s law.

The ramification of this reckless decision may be startling. While Judge Somers clearly holds that the MMMA is unconstitutional, he has also inadvertently ruled that Michigan’s Public Health Code is unconstitutional. By holding that “field preemption” bars the Michigan medical marijuana law, Michigan cannot decriminalize medical marijuana any more than it can promulate rules regarding various scheduled controlled substances. Michigan cannot enforce its laws against possession, delivery or manufacturing of cocaine, heroin or LSD because the federal government’s CSA is “sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress ‘left no room’ for supplementary state regulation.” All state drug laws, according to Somers’ legal reasoning, are preempted through field preemption.

While this ruling is clearly unsupported by prevailing authorities, Judge Somers has ruled that the 19th District Court is unable to enforce virtually any drug crime.  This is clearly an absurd result stemming from the judge’s eagerness to attack the MMMA.

For more on this subject, please review, “Judge Mark W. Somers and the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act: Reckless Judicial Activism.”

Background

On November 4, 2008, 63% of Michigan voters approved the MMMA. Only 37% of voters opposed the new law. Medical marijuana opponents immediately began a clever attempt to undermine the statute, claiming that the Act is confusing and poorly drafted. A core group of vocal anti-marijuana advocates have proven ready and willing to actively oppose the law through legal chicanery. These groups include local municipal leaders, prosecutors, and some judges who are palpably frustrated that they could not impose their will at the polls.

Judge Somers has been a respected member of the bench since he was elected in 2002. Four years after his election, he was named as the chief judge by the Michigan Supreme Court. He received renewed voter approval by winning reelection in a hotly contested race on the same day that Michigan voters passed the MMMA. His rulings from the bench tend to be conservative. He usually is careful in his deliberations, and he is respectful to people who appear in his courtroom.

Against this backdrop, however, Judge Somers has not been immune to criticism. In a lawsuit filed by a former court employee, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals recently reported references to several complaints levied against the judge regarding his religious views:

Judge Somers used official court stationary on three separate occasions to send official correspondence affixing a quote from a biblical passage . . . a “Muslim boy got a stiffer sentence because of the fact that whatever offense he had, it happened during . . . Ramadan . . . [o]thers complained that Judge Somers lectured defendants about marijuana, declaring that it was the devil’s weed or Satan’s surge, and that he would ask litigants in court if they go to church. [Emphasis added.]

Pucci v Nineteenth District Court, 628 F.3d 752, 756-757 (Dec. 16, 2010).

Given that Judge Somers allegedly views marijuana as “the devil’s weed or Satan’s surge” [sic, recte scourge], it comes as little surprise that the judge holds a dim view of the MMMA.

Facts

In the case of People of the City of Dearborn vs. Robert Michael Brandon [Click for link to the opinion], the defendant was charged with possession of marijuana. Brandon filed a motion to dismiss the case, claiming that he was entitled to use marijuana as a medical necessity even though he did not have a medical marijuana card at the time of his arrest. The law allows a person to raise a medical necessity defense at trial, but the accused must prove these facts to a jury. Without the protection granted by the medical marijuana card, the jury is free to reject a medical necessity defense and convict the accused.

Brandon did not visit a doctor for nearly four months after he was arrested, and his original trial date was scheduled two months before he bothered to visit a doctor employed as a subcontractor by a “medical marijuana certification center” called “Green Trees of Detroit.” Brandon’s doctor testified and admitted that she never examined him and never performed any tests. During their single meeting that lasted only 20 to 40 minutes, Brandon provided the doctor with no medical records and explained that he had never received treatment for his “severe, chronic pain.” Brandon had not seen a doctor in six to eight years before his visit to the certification center. Nonetheless, Brandon received a medical certificate from the Green Trees’ licensed physician reflecting that he suffered from severe, chronic pain and would benefit from the medical use of marijuana.

Proponents of the MMMA should not be discouraged by these facts. The law does not tolerate mischief. The statute plainly states that the physician must make a “professional opinion, after having completed a full assessment of the patient’s medical history and current medical condition made in the course of a bona fide physician-patient relationship, the patient is likely to receive therapeutic or palliative benefit from the medical use of marihuana to treat or alleviate the patient’s serious or debilitating medical condition or symptoms of the patient’s serious or debilitating medical condition.” [Emphasis added.]

Prevailing Law

In People v Redden, ___ Mich App ___ (Sept. 14, 2010), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that, in the absence of a valid medical marijuana card, a person accused of violating Michigan’s marijuana laws must prove an asserted medical necessity defense at trial. The Court held that it is inappropriate for a trial court to summarily dismiss a case at a motion hearing if probable cause exists to believe that the defendant may have violated the law.

Redden is directly on point in the Brandon case, and it is controlling authority that Judge Somers was bound to follow by the doctrine of stare decisis. Given the facts and prevailing law, Judge Somers should have denied the motion and set the matter for trial.

Even if Brandon actually suffers from chronic pain, a jury would undoubtedly reject his medical necessity defense. The defense in this case appears manufactured after the fact, irrespective of Brandon’s medical condition, and it seems he would fail to prove that he had a “bona fide” relationship with the doctor. Judge Somers noted this in a footnote, but the judge refused to rule on these narrow grounds. In fact, the prosecutor raised this argument, and Judge Somers explicitly held that “the court declines to rule on the remaining issues presented by the parties.”

Lack of Judicial Restraint

Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. A judge cannot flippantly declare a statute to be unconstitutional. “A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). But for the doctrine of judicial restraint, judges would be able to dictate the law without due regard toward our other branches of government, “placing us under the despotism of an oligarchy” in the words of Thomas Jefferson.

By ruling that the MMMA was unconstitutional, Judge Somers intentionally ignored the doctrine of judicial restraint. In 1936, the doctrine of judicial restraint was thoroughly explained by US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, one of the most famous and influential figures ever to serve on the high court. As Justice Brandeis explained in part, “The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. . . . [I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.” Ashwander v TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

Faced with denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss and setting the matter for trial or exercising the awesome responsibility of judicial review established in the landmark case of Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), Judge Somers opted to violate the doctrine of judicial restraint, wiping out the votes of 3,006,820 citizens through judicial fiat.

To read more on this subject, please take a look at:  ”Judge Mark Somers and the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act: Federal Preemption Analysis“

There is no magical cure to solve Romulus’ financial crisis, but the City of Romulus should not waste money on attorney fees. The city prosecutor, attorney Raymond Guzall, III from Seifman & Guzall PC in Farmington Hills, Michigan, is hell-bent on recklessly charging taxpayers for unnecessary work.

In connection with every motion in a criminal case and every appeal of a criminal conviction arising out of the 34th District Court in Romulus, Guzall seeks civil lawsuit sanctions.Under a rarely used statute, parties to a civil lawsuit are allowed to seek compensation from the other side if a lawsuit is so clearly frivolous that it merits an imposition of sanctions. The statute is rarely used by the courts because the lawsuit must be clearly unsupported by any factual development and contrary to the law.

Several courts have expressed that Guzall cannot use the civil statute in criminal proceedings, denying his request for sanctions. Criminal and civil cases are distinctly different. Guzall has never produced a single authority that supports his position, but he repeatedly files the same motion. Taxpayers are charged for his time “researching and briefing” this issue, irrespective of the fact that he simply cuts, copies and pastes the same argument from one pleading to the next.

Guzall also seeks sanctions under the Michigan Court Rules. Under the provisions of another rarely used rule, an attorney to a civil or criminal case assures the court that by signing a document, the pleading is “well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Sanctions may be awarded if a party violates this rule. In criminal cases, however, “[a] lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding . . . may so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.” MRPC 3.1 Only one published case has ever held that the rule can theoretically apply to criminal cases, but the higher court reversed an award of attorney fees. See, People v Herrera (After Remand), 204 Mich App 333, 514 NW2d 543 (1994) (Incarcerated prisoner repeatedly filed the same pleading with the court after the requested relief had been denied.)

As a watermark, no other prosecutor in the state files similar motions. From the Wayne County prosecutor’s office down to the smallest townships, prosecutors do not request sanctions. Why would Guzall, on contract with the City of Romulus, file these unusual motions?

Taxpayers might assume that Guzall is looking out for Romulus, since the prosecutor seeks to recoup money spent prosecuting cases. Of all the instances where Guzall has filed his motions and briefs seeking sanctions, however, he has succeeded in recouping only $250, later spending thousands defending that award. Meanwhile, untold hours have been assessed to the City by its prosecutor to pay for the various billable hours that he passes along, bilking the budget in every case.

Guzall knows that he will upset a defense lawyer by filing his request for sanctions. It is a personal jab at the lawyer, aimed more to insult than help his client recoup attorney fees. He knows that the accused will have to bear the cost of paying the defense attorney to respond to the motion, even though his own client will also have to pay. Like a bull in a china shop, Guzall is unconcerned with the consequences of his actions.

Putting a halt to Guzall’s reckless practices will not cure Romulus’ budget deficit, but it surely can’t hurt.

ESPN analyst and former Michigan Fab Five star Jalen Rose was arrested in West Bloomfield, Michigan, for drunk driving on March 11, 2011.  The story did not come to light until March 29, 2011. According to Patch.com, “Rose, 38, originally of Detroit, was arrested around 2 a.m. March 11, West Bloomfield Police Lt. Tim Diamond said Wednesday. Rose was accused of operating a vehicle while impaired after his white Cadillac Escalade slid off Walnut Lake Road west of Middlebelt Road and overturned.”

On March 30, 2011,  Rose released the following statement:

On March 11th, I was driving to my home when I was involved in a single vehicle automobile accident.  I voluntarily submitted to a blood alcohol screening and I was confident it was safe for me to drive.

Although I was not feeling impaired, the results of these tests indicated that my blood alcohol level was above the legal limit.  I regret the decision to drive home that evening and am grateful that no one was hurt in the accident.  I apologize to my family, my employer and each and every one of my supporters for my lapse in judgment.  I am particularly sorry for disappointing those who trust me to serve as a role model for young people.

I accept full responsibility for my actions and look forward to a resolution of the legal matter as soon as possible.

The blood alcohol test revealed a .12 blood alcohol content, over Michigan’s .08 legal limit, but the specimen was allowed to go unrefrigerated for several days before undergoing testing.  Worse still, the laboratory that tested the blood sample is being audited this year and has failed to incorporate mandatory quality management systems detailed by ISO/IEC 17025.  There could be substantial challenges raised in this case, especially since Rose reported that he was confident that he was safe to drive.

With his apology and public regrets already released, it seems that Rose is preparing to enter a guilty plea in this case based largely on the blood test result.  This is not unusual in celebrity DUI cases. With a few notable exceptions, media stars typically attempt to quell the excitement surrounding a drunk driving arrest, quietly entering a plea and receiving probationary sentences.  Until Paris Hilton and Lindsay Lohan made headlines, celebrities were nearly exempt from incarceration on DUI cases.  Even in those rare exceptions, Hilton and Lohan were both granted probation until they violated the terms of the court orders.

Although Rose was involved in an accident, police admit that slippery road conditions were to blame. Since Michigan law provides that it is legal to drink and drive, Rose should be very cautious entering a plea agreement that might land him in jail. On April 20, 2011, he will appear before Judge Kimberly Small of the 48th District Court.  Judge Small boasts a liberal record when it comes to handing down jail sentences on drunk driving cases.  A person accused of driving drunk in her courtroom is presumed innocent and given a fair trial, but a convicted drunk driver faces harsh penalties including jail in almost every case.

The hearing was at the Michigan Driver Assessment & Appeal Division before Hearing Officer Michael J. Modelski on an implied consent issue.  Under Michigan’s implied consent statute, a motorist must submit to a chemical test after the driver is arrested for drunk driving.  Implied-consent actions stem from an arrest for drunk driving or any other crime described in MCL 257.625c(1).  Implied-consent hearings involve drivers who have allegedly refused to take the chemical test of a law enforcement officer’s choosing, without legal excuse.  Prior to the request for the chemical test, the officer must establish reasonable grounds to believe that the driver committed a crime described in Section 625c(1) of the Michigan Vehicle Code, and that the officer arrested the driver for one of the appropriate violations, and advised the driver of the chemical test rights.

In today’s case, Trooper Rowe testified.  It is the officer’s burden of proof at these hearings.  After he had completed his testimony, HO Modelski allowed cross-examination. Immediately following my first question, HO Modelski interrupted and asked the officer a question:  ”Did you ever actually read the suspect his chemical test rights?”  The answer was “not all of them, no.”

HO Modelski knew that I intended to ask extensive questions during today’s hearing.  Potential criminal charges could be defended employing the officer’s testimony from the DLAD/DAAD hearing.  Given that it was clear that the officer could not meet his burden, HO Modelski stopped the hearing and issued a favorable decision.

So… I won a case in one question!

Geez… the “slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars.”  That’s pretty scary.  And those numbers are used to erode our Constitutional protections against police interference.  ”Can I see your papers please, Komrad,” comes straight out of an old spy thriller in East Berlin.

Too bad it’s a complete crock.  The numbers were lies.  All lies.  We gave up some of our liberties because the government lied to us.

Here are some of the leading causes of death.  You can judge for yourself:

*Reported elsewhere as 29,846 by CDC.

**”10,792 deaths were the drunk driver or his passenger.  2,206 were in other vehicles or pedestrians, implying that they were all blameless victims. 2,206 is 5% of all traffic fatalities. If any of the 2,206 were impaired is not recorded and who was at-fault is never discussed.” from www.getmadd.com, retrieved on March 23, 2011.

Ms. Beauchamp testified that, in her expert opinion, 20 ng/mL THC was a “high” result.  She was unable to directly share a source to verify her opinion, and the peer-reviewed article she relied upon specifically disagreed with her conclusion. Our firm promptly requested access to the documentary data that she elusively pointed to in order to support her opinion.

In the meanwhile, attorney Beth LaCosse from the Upper Peninsula obtained the Michigan State Police Toxicology Unit’s internal methodologies for marijuana blood testing.  These policies date back several years, showing how the MSP have changed their scientific method to fit the prevailing law.  Good science does not follow the law.  It should be the other way around, but this reveals that the MSP is a political body.  The folks in the toxicology unit are laboratory technicians trained to provide biased opinions not well-grounded in science.

In essence, the MSP wants to provide free experts for prosecutors around the state to use whenever an issue crops up in a DUI case.  Judges acting as gatekeepers against junk science need to pay careful attention to the qualifications of these free prosecutorial experts.  (In many instances, judges are far more inclined to attack defense experts, viewing these people as hired guns.)

But back to Beth LaCosse… Beth uncovered the MSP internal guidelines for testing blood for the presence of THC, the active drug in marijuana.  These documents reveal that Ms. Beauchamp provided an “expert opinion” that was contrary to her own lab’s internal policies.  MSP guidelines reflect that 10 ng/mL is a low result, while 50 ng/mL is a high result. Setting aside the prevailing scientific opinion that little can be gleaned from a numerical result, Ms. Beauchamp’s opinion was exactly what the government wanted to hear, even though it is contrary to the laboratory’s own policies.

I guess you get what you pay for…

We have posted the guidelines for everyone to review here.

What is best in life? To crush the prosecutors and police. See them driven before you. And hear the lamantations of their women.

The Criminal Defense Attorney of Michigan (CDAM) has general members, sustaining members, and a third category, “Constitutional Warrior.”  William Maze of the Maze Legal Group has become a Constitutional Warrior!

As Maze has become increasingly involved in the Michigan criminal defense bar, this important landmark reflects his increased committment to improving the quality of criminal defense across the state.